

BONN ECON NEWS

January 29–February 2, 2024

Overview

People

BGSE graduates

Workshops and seminars

Tuesday, January 30, 2024

Bonn Applied Microeconomics Seminar (CRC TR 224 Seminar)

Michael Thaler (University College London)

“The Supply of Motivated Beliefs”

Wednesday, January 31, 2024

Job Talk W1 Professorship Macroeconomics

Giulia Gitti (Brown University)

“Nonlinearities in the Regional Phillips Curve with Labor Market Tightness”

MPI EEG Seminar

Pascaline Dupas (Princeton University)

“Keeping Up Appearances: An Experimental Investigation on Social Pressure and Relative Ranks”

Finance/CRC/ECONtribute Seminar

Claudia Custodio (Imperial College London)

“Access to Credit, Exports and Product Quality”

Micro Theory Seminar

Atulya Jain (HEC Paris)

“Informing agents amidst biased narratives”

Thursday, February 1, 2024

Finance Brown Bag Seminar

Anna Mogilevskaja (BGSE, University of Bonn)

“Inflation Expectations and Durable Consumption: New Evidence during High- vs. Low-Inflation Periods”

Friday, February 2, 2024

Job Talk W2 Professorship Macroeconomics

Pavel Brendler (University of Bonn)

“Optimal income redistribution”

Job Talk W1 Professorship Macroeconomics

Morgane Richard (University College London)

“The Spatial and Distributive Implications of Working-from-home: A General Equilibrium Model”

Applied Micro Coffee

Guy Yanay (Hebrew University Jerusalem)

“The Effect of Ambiguity Aversion on Belief Elicitation”

People

BGSE graduates

Patrick Lahr

Dissertation: Essays in Theoretical Microeconomics

Workshops and seminars

Tuesday, January 30, 2024

Bonn Applied Microeconomics Seminar (CRC TR 224 Seminar)

Michael Thaler
(University College London)

"The Supply of Motivated Beliefs"

Time

14:15–15:30 CET

Location

IZA, Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 9

Abstract

When people choose what messages to send to others, they often consider how others will interpret the messages. A sender may expect a receiver to engage in motivated reasoning, leading the receiver to trust good news more than bad news, relative to a Bayesian. This paper experimentally studies how motivated reasoning affects information transmission in political settings. Senders are randomly matched with receivers whose political party's stances happen to be aligned or misaligned with the truth, and either face incentives to be rated as truthful or face no incentives. Incentives to be rated as truthful cause senders to be less truthful; when incentivized, senders send false information to align messages with receivers' politically-motivated beliefs. The adverse effect of incentives is not appreciated by receivers, who rate senders in both conditions as being equally likely to be truthful. A complementary experiment further identifies senders' beliefs about receivers' motivated reasoning as the mechanism driving these results. Senders are additionally willing to pay to learn the politics of their receivers, and use this information to send more false messages.

Job Talk W1 Professorship Macroeconomics

Giulia Gitti (Brown University)	"Nonlinearities in the Regional Phillips Curve with Labor Market Tightness"
Time 12:15 CET	Abstract TBA
Location Juridicum, Faculty Meeting Room (U1.040)	
Hybrid https://uni-bonn.zoom-x.de/j/62374147597?pwd=NHFCQlpxVmVpWWJFbXBMdW9uS2xPUT09	

MPI EEG Seminar

Pascaline Dupas (Princeton University)	"Keeping Up Appearances: An Experimental Investigation on Social Pressure and Relative Ranks"
Coauthors Laura Hernandez-Nunez, Marcel Fafchamps	We investigate the potential welfare cost of relative rank considerations using a series of vignettes and lab-in-the-field experiments with over 2,000 individuals in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. We show that: (1) individuals judged to be of a lower rank are perceived as more likely to be victimized in many aspects of life; and (2) in response, individuals distort their appearance and consumption choices in order to appear of higher rank. These effects are strong and economically significant. As predicted by a simple signaling model, the distortion is larger for individuals with low (but not too low) SES.
Time 15:00–16:00 CET	
Online https://zoom.us/j/96986834911?pwd=eElKaFFDYTdsbGRNUk5saitSNWh6UT09	

Finance/CRC/ECONtribute Seminar

Claudia Custodio
(Imperial College London)

"Access to Credit, Exports and Product Quality"

Coauthors

Christopher Hansman, Bernardo Mendes

Time

14:45–16:00 CET

Location

Juridicum, Faculty Lounge (0.036)

Hybrid

<https://uni-bonn.zoom.us/j/95735374743?pwd=T3BYbWt1bVZNeIkvcDV3SUcxUlkrUT09>

Abstract

We show that access to credit is a key barrier to export. We analyze a credit support scheme in Portugal that provided government guarantees on loans to small and medium-sized enterprises. Regression discontinuity estimates based on program eligibility criteria indicate that qualifying firms persistently increase total value of exports, export probability, and export destinations. Access to credit increases the variety and quality of the products a firm exports. Firms that qualify for the scheme charge higher unit prices for narrowly defined goods, and use higher quality inputs, including imported goods. Our results highlight an understudied mechanism linking financial and economic development.

Micro Theory Seminar

Atulya Jain
(HEC Paris)

"Informing agents amidst biased narratives"

Time

16:30–17:45 CET

Location

Juridicum, Faculty Meeting Room (U1.040)

Abstract

I study the strategic interaction between a benevolent sender (who provides data) and a biased narrator (who interprets data) who compete to persuade a boundedly rational receiver (who takes action). The receiver does not know the data-generating model. She chooses between models provided by the sender and the narrator using the maximum likelihood principle, selecting the one that best fits the data given her prior belief. The sender faces a trade-off between providing precise information and minimizing misinterpretation. Surprisingly, full disclosure can be suboptimal and even backfire. I identify a finite set of models that contain the optimal data-generating model, which maximizes the receiver's expected utility. The sender can guarantee non-negative value of information, preventing harm from misinterpretation. I apply this framework to information campaigns and employee feedback.

Thursday, February 1, 2024

Finance Brown Bag Seminar

Anna Mogilevskaja (BGSE, University of Bonn)	"Inflation Expectations and Durable Consumption: New Evidence during High- vs. Low-Inflation Periods"
Time 14:45–15:30 CET	Abstract This paper examines the relationship between inflation expectations and consumer spending in low- and high-inflation environments. We find that the effect of short-term inflation expectations on planned spending is twice as large in a high-inflation environment compared to a low-inflation environment, even when controlling for expected income changes and wealth. However, inflation expectations do not significantly affect current spending, regardless of the inflation environment. We also investigate the role of individual uncertainty about future inflation and show that uncertainty determines intertemporal decision-making. The absolute marginal effect of individual uncertainty is smaller during high- compared to low-inflation periods. These results suggest that other channels, such as increased attention to inflation in high-inflation environments, affect the relation between inflation expectations and spending decisions.
Location Juridicum, Faculty Lounge (0.036)	
Hybrid https://uni-bonn.zoom.us/j/95735374743?pwd=T3BYbWt1bVZNelkvcDV3SUcxUlkrUT09	

Friday, February 2, 2024

Job Talk W2 Professorship Macroeconomics

Pavel Brendler (University of Bonn)	"Optimal income redistribution"
Time 08:30 CET	Abstract TBA
Location Juridicum, Faculty Meeting Room (U1.040)	
Hybrid https://uni-bonn.zoom-x.de/j/62374147597?pwd=NHFQClpxVmVpWWJFbXBmdW9uS2xPUT09	

Job Talk W1 Professorship Macroeconomics

Morgane Richard (University College London)	"The Spatial and Distributive Implications of Working-from-home: A General Equilibrium Model"
Time 12:15 CET	Abstract TBA
Location Juridicum, Room (0.042)	
Hybrid https://uni-bonn.zoom-x.de/j/62374147597?pwd=NHFCQlpxVmVpWWJFbXBMdW9uS2xPUT09	

Applied Micro Coffee

Guy Yanay (Hebrew University Jerusalem)	"The Effect of Ambiguity Aversion on Belief Elicitation"
Time 11:30-12:15 CET	Abstract
Location IZA, Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 9	Ambiguity aversion is a well-documented phenomenon whereby people are willing to pay a premium to avoid environments where probabilities are not explicitly stated. These prevailing attitudes are usually disregarded when eliciting beliefs. This project shows that ambiguity aversion introduces systemic bias into two of the most common methods used in incentivized belief elicitation: measurement via probability matching is shown to be downward-biased; measurement via the binarized scoring rule is shown to be center-biased. These predictions are derived from multiple models of ambiguity aversion and explain the recent empirical 'failings' of these methods. To solve for these biases, I propose an adjusted belief elicitation method which is unbiased, but not always applicable.